高薪未必养廉--基于权力异化的视角

High Pay Avoids Corruption Certainly? Theory from Power Dissimilation

本文基于高管薪酬管制和放权改革的制度背景,选取2003-2012年中国非金融上市公司为样本,考察高管外部薪酬差距与奢华在职消费的关系,并从权力异化的角度解释高薪未必养廉的逻辑。实证结果表明:(1)高管外部薪酬差距并不能消弭奢华在职消费,该现象并不因公司产权性质的不同而有所差异;(2)高管外部薪酬差距部分是由高管权力导致的;(3)由高管权力导致的高薪进一步加重了奢华在职消费。以上结果说明单纯给予上市公司高管高额薪酬并不能抑制奢华在职消费;权力膨胀可能使得高管在获得高额薪酬的同时追求能够彰显身份地位的在职消费。

We explored the relationship between external pay gap of top management and perquisites based on institution of regulation on managerial compensation and puts authority to let benefit reform, using a sample of non-financial listed firms from 2003 to 2012. The evidences show that external pay gap of top management is significantly and positively correlated with perquisites in both SOEs and private enterprises. Further study found that the greater the Managerial Power, the greater the external executive pay gap, and the positive relationship between external pay gap of top management and perquisites is more pronounced. This empirical findings indicated that high pay don＇t avoids corruption certainly, managerial power would prompt executives pursue high pay and perquisites both.