异质用户群中创新扩散的协调困境和补贴策略

Coordination Dilemma and Subsidy Strategy of Innovation Diffusion among Heterogeneous User Groups

创新进入市场首先要克服的是协调困境,潜在用户群间是否采用创新决策的行为存在互补性,在用户群协调的无效区间,创新即使具有优势也不能在市场中成功扩散。文章从技术转换成本、技术收益、同行影响和用户数量特征描述了用户群的异质性,对异质用户群中创新扩散的决策问题进行抽象分析,建立不完全信息下用户协调问题的全局博弈模型,得出协调无效区间的分布,发现协调成功的临界值与私人信息的噪声分布无关,等于所有用户转换成本与收益比的聚集。对用户进行补贴能够降低协调成功的临界值,从而有效克服协调困境。优化补贴策略是选择一部分用户群进行完全补贴,目标用户群的选择标准是:创新采用的决策对同行影响大,而自身从中获得的收益却相对小。

The first step of innovation diffusion is to get over coordination dilemma , which is caused by the complementary adop-tion decisions among potential user groups. The users won＇t adopt innovation in the inefficient interval even the innovation is superior. The paper describes heterogeneity of user groups from technology transfer costs, profits, and peer influence and user numbers. A global game model is built to analyze the innovation adoption decision of heterogeneous user groups under incomplete information. We get the distribution interval of inefficient coordination. Threshold value of coordination is equal to the aggregation of cost to benefit and can be reduced by subsidizing the users. The optimal subsidy policy is to fully subsidize seeding groups. The targeted seeding groups have strong peer influence, while its own benefit from adoption is relatively small.