基于互动博弈的组织不同层级间激励协同机制设计

Mechanism Design of Incentive Synergy between Different Levels of Organizations Based on Game Theory

基于双重委托代理理论,以组织效益最大化为目标,构建了静态纳什均衡模型及动态序贯博弈模型,分析了既定情境下的高低层级群体互动博弈过程及其对策。模型的演绎机制揭示:在提供顶层设计前提下,短期内,组织对高层级群体绩效与奖惩紧密挂钩,将提升组织监管有效性;而组织越过高层级群体对低层级群体加重惩罚是无效的;长期看,无论对高层级群体还是低层级群体,组织必须配有一定程度的负激励,负激励是更为有效和持久的激励。

This paper constructs a static Nash equilibrium game model and a dynamic sequential game respectively under the given context based on the dual principal -agent theory. It draws the conclusion that with the principal＇s design, organiza- tion would be beneficial if the incentive system closely links with high levels＇ performance; and the incentive system would be ineffectively if it enhances the degree of punishment on its low levels while bypassing the high levels. In the long term, organization must be equipped with a certain degree of negative incentive for both high levels and low levels for it is more ef- fective and lasting.