分权、地方债务与现代财政改革——基于财政分权不同角度的效应分析

Decentralization,Local Debt and Modern Financial Reform—Based on the Effect Analysis from Different Angles of Fiscal Decentralization

国内理论界普遍认同地方债务内生于财政分权体制,主流观点是收支不平衡引致地方政府支出规模的扩张;反对派支持"利维坦假说",认为分权可以限制地方政府支出的过度扩大。但分权究竟如何具体作用于地方债务,仍有待深入研究。本文建立了财政分权与地方债务关联的理论框架,从支出、收入和纵向财政不平衡三个角度进行了实证检验。结果表明,分权效应不能一概而论,提高收入分权,降低支出分权,缓解纵向财政不均衡,将有助于减少地方债务。构建现代政府间关系,"五五分成"后亟需增加中央一般性转移支付,严格政府支出管理;同时适度放松收入管理,赋予地方政府有限的税收立法权,构建地方税体系至关重要。

It is generally recognized by domestic academia that local debt was born within fiscal decentralization. The mainstream view is that payment imbalance will lead to the expansion of local government spending scale. Another view supports the 'leviathan'hypothesis,and points out that fiscal decentralization can limit the excessive expansion of local government spending. But how fiscal decentralization functions specifically in local debt remains to be further research. This article sets up a theoretical framework of fiscal decentralization associated with local government debt,and conducts empirical tests from three angles of expenditure decentralization,revenue decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance. The results show that the decentralization effects should not be treated as the same. Improving revenue decentralization,reducing expenditure decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance will be helpful to a lower level of the local debt. To build the modern government relationship,it needs to increase central general transfer payment after the 'split 50-50',with strict management of government spending. At the same time,moderately relaxing revenue management,giving the local government limited tax revenue legislative right,and building a local tax system is very important.