议价能力影响下供应链间价格和服务竞争均衡策略

Equilibrium Strategies of Supply Chains with Price and Service Competition under Bargaining Ability

以两条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的竞争供应链为对象,分别建立Stackelberg博弈、Nash博弈以及Stackelberg-Nash博弈三种决策模型,研究供应链间竞争强度以及制造商零售商议价能力变化对制造商、零售商、顾客获益的影响。在供应链竞争环境中,无论是制造商拥有较大的议价能力,还是制造商零售商拥有相等的议价能力,制造商能否从提供服务中获益取决于议价能力和服务成本系数;而相对于制造商为领导者情形,顾客在制造商零售商拥有相等议价能力时获益更多。

Taking two supply chains as research objects, each containing one manufacturer and one retailer, and establishing three decision models respectively： Stackelberg game, Nash game, and Stackelberg-Nash, the paper studies the effect of competition degree between supply chains and manufacturers and retailers＇ bargaining ability change on the performance of manufacturers, retailers and customers. Under competing supply chains, no matter the manufacturers act as Stackelberg leaders or the manufacturers and retailers hold the equal bargaining ability, whether the manufacturers can obtain much more profit depends on the service cost coefficients and bargaining ability; in contrast to the manufacturer Stackelberg scenario, the customers are better off when the manufacturers and retailers hold the equal bargaining ability.