摘要
基于短期借款的流动性风险和公司治理作用双重特性,本文以中国A股上市公司2004—2014年的数据为样本,利用固定效应模型,实证检验了公司债务期限结构与股价崩盘风险间的关系。研究发现,在控制其他可能影响股价崩盘风险因素和潜在的内生性问题后,短期借款占比越高,公司股价崩盘风险越高。这说明短期借款并没有发挥积极的治理作用,从而抑制借款偿还流动性风险而导致的管理层负面信息隐藏行为。进一步研究发现,短期借款占比与股价崩盘风险之间的正相关关系在国有企业和信息不对称程度高的公司更加显著。
Based on the liquidity risk and corporate governance function of short-term debt, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate debt maturity structure and stock price crash risk with the fixed effect model, using listed companies＇ data of China＇s A-share markets from 2004 to 2014. It finds that the higher the proportion of short-term debt, the higher the stock price crash risk, which suggests that the short-term debt does not take an active part in monitoring directors＇ bad news hording behavior. Further research finds that the positive relationship between short-term debt and stock price crash risk is stronger among SOEs and high level information asymmetry corporations.
作者
李栋栋
LI Dong-dong(School of Management, Fudan Universit)
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第11期37-52,共16页
Economic Theory and Business Management
关键词
债务期限结构
股价崩盘风险
公司治理
所有权性质
信息不对称
debt maturity structure
stock price crash risk
corporate governance
ownership nature
information asymmetry
