基于演化博弈的无居民海岛生态补偿机制研究

On Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Evolutionary Game-based Uninhabited Islands

建立海岛生态补偿机制是无居民海岛生态环境保护工作的主要内容和促进海岛资源永续利用的重要保障。运用无居民海岛生态补偿利益主体非对称性演化博弈分析的复制动态模型,重点探讨利益相关主体间的行为及相互影响的动态演变过程,讨论演化参数结果的稳定性。结果表明:双方博弈策略的选择很大程度依赖于系统初始状态,并与博弈双方支付矩阵的关键参数变化有关;利益群体各决策选择的比例是稳定均衡策略的重要决定因素,增加无居民海岛生态补偿利益主体选择"保护"和"补偿"策略的比例,可加快稳定均衡策略的有效形成;加强对无居民海岛开发利用利益主体生态环境保护的监管力度,有利于实现无居民海岛开发利用与生态环境保护的共赢。

It is not merely a main content to protect the ecological environment of uninhabited islands but also an important guarantee for sustainable utilization of islands resources to establish the ecological compensation mechanism of islands. The duplicate dynamic model, which is based on non-symmetric evolutionary game analysis of the stakeholders of eco-compensation of uninhabited islands, aims at exploring the dynamic evolutionary process of the action and interaction between stakeholders, the stability of evolutionary parameters, and the formation of stable strategy of evolutionary equilibrium. The results of analyzing the evolutionary stability with game model indicate that： the strategical choices of the both sides largely depend on the initial state of the system, together with the key parameters of their payoff matrix. The proportion of interest groups＇ decisive choices decide on whether the stable equilibrium strategy can be formed. Increasing the proportion of selecting the ＂protection＂ and ＂compensation＂ strategy by the implementation group and the benefit group can accelerate the formation of stable equilibrium strategy effectively. Strengthen the supervision of ＂nonprotection＂ and ＂non-compensation＂ by stakeholders and the local government and island management sectors, which is of great significance to achieve a win-win situation between the exploration and utilization of uninhabited islands and the protection of ecological environment.