内部控制质量高的公司能获得更多的补贴吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Can Companies with High-quality Internal Control Get Higher Susidies?

以2007-2013年中国上市公司为样本,基于政府主导企业内部控制建设发展模式和政企关系的构建及互动机制,考察公司内部控制质量对其获得政府补贴的影响。研究发现,内部控制质量高的公司更易于获得政府补贴和更多的补贴,且对于民营公司的影响更显著;政治关联显著影响了内控质量和政府补贴的正相关关系,对于政治关联强的民营公司来说,高质量内部控制对获取政府补贴的显示效应减弱乃至消失,表明政治关系作为一种非正式的替代机制发挥重要影响。研究结果有助于辩证认识政府补贴的作用,也有助于决策层根据影响企业行为的约束性前提而采用有针对性的政策措施。

With China listed companies from 2007-2013 as sample, this paper investigates the influence of enterprise internal control quality on obtaining government subsidies based on government-led enterprise internal control development construction mode, government- enterprise relationship construction and its interaction mechanism. The results show that the enterprises with high internal control quality have an easier access to government subsidies with a more significant influence on private enterprises, the political association has a significant impact on the positive correlation between internal control quality and government subsidies, and that for the private companies with strong political association, the displaying effects of high- quality internal control on obtaining government subsidies weaken or even disappear, which indicates that political association plays a significant influence as an informal alternative mechanism. The research conclusion is conducive for us to dialectibally understand government subsidies and for the decision- making influencing enterprise behaviors and take specific measures. layer to understand the restrictive premises of policy