财政转移支付、财政努力与区域经济发展

Fiscal Transfer Payment,Fiscal Effort and Regional Economic Development

利用2003-2013年东中西三大区域的数据,分析了财政转移支付对区域经济差距的调节作用,发现在财政转移支付制度影响下,人均固定资产投资形成资本量相比于人力资本、技术水平过多,资本边际产出递减。这使得原本经济发展就相对落后的地区缺少拉动经济长期增长的动力,即西部地区在接受较大规模的财政转移支付的条件下依然没有很好地促进经济产出。同时,通过实证检验得出财政转移支付制度本身会影响地方政府的财政努力,地区间的财政竞争会导致财政收入的不稳,进而影响到政府用于科教文卫等方面的支出规模。并且,地方政府对于转移支付资金的使用结构不合理,转移支付占地方政府支出或财政收入的比重越大,用于科技、教育等方面的投入比重越小。政府的财政选择并没有向拉动经济长期增长的新要素倾斜,原本经济落后地区未能在转移支付制度作用下缩小与发达地区的差距。因此,中央政府可考虑合理调整转移支付结构,构建具有正向激励机制的转移支付制度,并纠正地方政府在此制度下财政支出的结构性偏向问题。

Based on the 2003-2013 data of three regions of eastern, central and western , this paper analyzes the moderating effect of fiscal transfer payment on the regional economic gap. Under the influence of the financial transfer payment system, the amount of capital formed by per capita investment in fixed assets is too much than by human capital and technology and the marginal output of capital de- creases. This makes the under-developed areas lack of power to stimulate economic growth in the long run, which means the western regions with larger scale of the fiscal transfer payment still could not promote the economic output. At the same time, the empirical a- nalysis discovers that fiscal transfer payment system will affect the local government fiscal effort, and the fiscal competition among re- gions will lead to fiscal revenue instability, thereby the government expenditure scale on science, education, culture and hygiene will be affected. And local governments use transfer payment funds unreasonably. The bigger the proportion of transfer payment in local gov- ernment expenditure or revenue, the smaller the investment proportion of science, technology and education is. The government＇s finan- cial choice does not tilt to the new elements of the long-term economic growth and the gap between the developed and under-developed regions failed to narrow with the transfer payment system. Therefore, the central government should adjust the transfer payment structure reasonably, and construct the transfer payment system with positive incentive mechanism to correct the structural deviation of local gov- ernment fiscal expenditure under this system.