不完全契约与国际贸易:一个评述

Incomplete Contract and International Trade:A Literature Review

不完全契约与国际贸易理论的交叉已成为国际贸易前沿研究课题。在制度经济学研究领域,随着对交易成本、产权问题的研究深入,逐步发展了不完全契约理论。契约的不完全性导致专用性投资在事前无法写入契约,事后收益的分配只能通过"再谈判"的方式进行,而这种再谈判因资产专用性而具有双边锁定效应,此外不完全契约也影响契约的执行,进而影响制度质量。不完全契约的这些特性对国际贸易和国际投资产生影响。本文对近年来发展起来的不完全契约对比较优势形成和贸易量影响的理论进行梳理,阐述契约质量在形成一国比较优势和出口差异化产品方面的理论与经验研究的进展;梳理不完全契约决定企业边界的理论,就不完全契约对跨国公司选择垂直整合还是外包的决定因素等前沿理论进行归纳和评述,并且对有关中国问题的研究贡献进行述评。基于对主要文献的梳理和分析,初步探讨了此领域未来可能的研究方向,为中国转型加新兴经济体的相关研究提供启发和参考。

The research on the relationship between incomplete contract and international trade has become a momentous theoretical issue. In the institutional economics, as the research of transaction cost and property rights moves along, the theory of incomplete contract has developed. The incomplete contract leads to that： specific investment can＇t be written in contract in advance, and the earnings distribution is only through ＂renegotiation＂ , and this renegotiation leads to bilateral lock. In addition, incomplete contract also influence the execution of the contract, then the quality of institution. These characteristics of incomplete contract impact on international trade and international investment. This paper analyses the theory that the incomplete contract influences comparative advantage and trade volume, and explains the development; we will estimate the theory that the incomplete contract is the determinant of multinational corporation＇s choice, vertical integration or outsourcing.