亏损抵扣、风险分担与企业投资--“沉睡合伙人”假说的经验证据

Loss Deduction,Risk Sharing and Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence on the Sleeping Partner Hypothesis

本文通过构建理论模型并利用1998-2007年中国规模以上工业企业数据,分析了企业所得税亏损抵扣的投资风险分担作用。研究发现,企业面对的投资风险水平和所得税税负越高,亏损抵扣的风险分担作用越强,企业越愿意从事风险型投资项目。上述结论较为稳健,但其作用存在异质性,创业期企业、非国有企业和连续亏损企业受益较少。政府适度放宽企业所得税亏损抵扣的政策规定、当好企业的"沉睡合伙人",对于促进市场投资和创新创业、推动供给侧结构性改革,有重要意义。

Based on a theoretical model and the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database over 1998-2007,we analyze the effect of corporate income tax loss deduction on risk taking. We find that the higher levels of corporate income tax burden and investment risk a company is facing,the more significant the effect is,i. e.,the more investment risks it will take. The empirical results are robust,but the effect is heterogeneous.Moderately relaxing the rules of corporate income tax loss deduction and being a good sleeping partner of firms can help the Chinese government promote investments,encourage innovation and entrepreneurship,and put forward reform of the supply side.