摘要
集体意向作为一个新兴的哲学研究热点涵盖了行动哲学、心灵哲学、道德哲学和社会科学哲学多方面的研究。哲学家们从各自不同的角度和路径对集体意向的可能性和本质进行了丰富而又深入的讨论。当代关于集体意向的理论有两大基本路径,即集体主义路径和个体主义路径。哲学家约翰·塞尔对于集体意向问题的论述具有重要价值,他所提出的非还原个体主义路径成功地解决了传统路径中的张力,在其中添加交互性条件就可以有效地推进对于集体意向的讨论。
The phenomenon of collective intentions is a controversial issue which is widely discussed in philosophy of action,philosophy of mind,moral philosophy and philosophy of social science.Philoso-phers hold different views on the nature of this phenomenon.There exist two maj or schools of thoughts concerning collective intentions:individualism and collectivism.John Searle's non-reductive individualism is an important contemporary contribution to the discussion.After introducing some challenge to Searle's concept of collective intentions,this paper aims to point out the flaw of Searle's account lies in its failure to recognize that mutuality is an indispensable feature of collective intentions.
作者
田洁
TIAN Jie(School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872)
出处
《中国人民大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期57-63,共7页
Journal of Renmin University of China
基金
中国人民大学科学研究基金项目"行动意志和集体责任"(15XNF030)
关键词
约翰·塞尔
集体意向
交互性条件
John Searle
collective intentions
mutuality condition