药品不良反应信息获取博弈分析

Game Analysis of Acquisition of Adverse Reaction Information

目的:分析药品不良反应信息的性质,探讨药品不良反应信息的供给问题,提出解决问题的方法与建议。方法:应用公共产品理论,考察不良反应信息的公共产品特征,建立医疗机构与药品企业在完全信息的博弈模型并进行比较分析,实现纳什均衡。结果与结论:药品不良反应信息具有非竞争性与非排他性,即公共产品特征;参与人相信其他参与人提供的药品不良反应信息越多,他自己的供给就会越少;因此,供给信息的人并不是越多越好;信息供给人的增加,反而会使供给量与帕累托最优水平差距增大;利润率的不同是影响信息供给量的重要原因,容易引起"搭便车"的问题,可以将利润率作为划分主体责任的标准;医疗机构、大型药品企业应该承担更多的责任,加强对医疗机构的管理,强调药品企业的主体责任,是保证药品信息供给的可行性措施。

Objective： To analyze the characteristics of the adverse drug reaction information and explore the supply problem of adverse drug reaction information, so as to put forward methods and suggestions to solve the problem effectively. Methods： According to the theory of public product, the characteristics of adverse reaction information as public product were investigated. The game model of medical institutions and pharmaceutical enterprises was established based on perfect information to achieve Nash equilibrium. Results and Conclusion： Adverse drug reaction information shows non-competitive and non-exclusive characteristics of the public goods. The participants involved believe that the more adverse drug reactions information offered by other participants involved, the less his own supply. Therefore, participants in this kind of information supply is not the more the better; the increase of participants will not aggrandize the amount of the information supply, the more the participants, the greater the gap of the actual supply; the optimal level of Pareto Profit rate is an important factor affecting the supply of information, which could easily lead to a ＂free rider＂ problem, as the profit margin can be regarded as the main responsibility standards; medical institutions and large pharmaceutical companies should assume more responsibilities; it is also suggested that we strengthen the management of medical institutions, clarify and define the main responsibility for pharmaceutical enterprises, so as to ensure the feasibility of measures of drug information supply.