政治关联、高管激励与资本结构

Political Connections,Executive Incentive and Capital Structure

高管激励与资本结构的关系一直是学者关注的热点,激励机制的有效性会对管理者行为产生影响,进而影响公司负债融资等财务政策。本文选取2007年-2012年中国沪深两市的上市公司为样本,研究高管激励对资本结构的影响,得到高管激励与资本结构呈非线性关系的结论。进一步研究发现,政治关联会影响高管激励与资本结构的关系,且在不同股权性质企业中发挥的作用不同。民营企业中政治关联对股权激励与资本结构关系的影响更加显著,国有企业中政治关联对现金薪酬激励与资本结构关系的影响更显著。

The relationship between executive incentive and capital structure has been a hot research point of scholars. The effectiveness of incentive will have an impact on managers＇ behavior and then affect the capital structure. This paper makes an empirical research into a large number of enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during the period 2007-2012 and finds that there is a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive incentive and capital structure. There is also strong evidence suggesting that political connections have a significant impact on the relationship between stock incentive and capital structure. More importantly,the results reveal that the impact of political connections on the relationship between executive incentive and capital structure depends on the enterprise nature.