任人唯亲的董事会文化与公司治理--一个文献综述

Cronyism Board Culture and Corporate Governance:A Literature Review

与成熟市场经济国家上市公司"优雅殷勤般的礼貌"和"隔靴搔痒式的批评"的董事会文化不同,在我国上市公司,建立在"一股独大"股权结构这一制度根源上的任人唯亲董事会文化使得董事会成员对于董事长的"人身依附"色彩更加浓郁。对于我国上市公司治理机制有效性的提高,除了从制度设计本身寻找对策外,我们还需要从任人唯亲董事会文化的改良来寻求出路。本文对任人唯亲董事会文化相关公司治理效应的实证研究进行文献综述。我们从基于社会连接对董事会成员的聘任、经理人超额薪酬问题、独董否定意见发表的任期阶段特征、独董返聘、独董换届未连任现象等方面讨论我国上市公司任人唯亲董事会文化的可能表征,并进一步从董事长权力、逆淘汰持不同意见独董的机制、独董任期设计、外部法律市场制度环境等视角来探讨我国上市公司任人唯亲董事会文化背后的制度因素和打破我国上市公司任人唯亲董事会文化的可能实现路径。制度的确立和文化的形成相辅相成,任人唯亲的董事会文化背后有其深厚的制度根源。看起来是一个文化问题,但我们可能需要同时从文化改良和制度设计两个方面同时着手加以改善和变革。

Compared with the emphasis on politeness and courtesy or mutual back scratching board culture in developed markets, the cronyism board culture in Chinese listed companies lead board members to attach themselves to the chairman too much. This paper reviews the empirical studies about the relationship between cronyism board culture and corporate governance. It explores some possible representation of the cronyism board culture such as social ties, CEO excess compensation, stage characteristic of independent directors' dissent, and the re-employment of independent director. Then the article discusses the institutional factors and the possible breaking routes of cronyism board culture. Institution establishment and culture formation supplements each other, and cronyism board culture has its institutional factors, so we need to improve the system from the perspective of both culture and institutional design.