新型农业经营主体联保贷款的机制设计:基于多任务委托代理理论的分析

Group Loan Mechanism Design of New Agricultural Management Entities:Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Theory

在考察新型农业经营主体群体特点、履约激励强度、违约制裁、自然风险与市场风险的基础上,构建了联保贷款的多任务委托代理博弈分析框架,讨论了银行如何通过激励机制和违约制裁将其转化为银行与新型农业经营主体间的契约约束来解决其融资困境。研究结果表明:有效的制裁成本、激励程度是开展新型农业经营主体联保贷款有效约束;银行进行激励设计,可满足不同新型农业经营主体在信贷额度、贷款利率、贷款期限、金融服务的需求;证实金融服务与农业保险的相互融合,可有效化解自然风险;证实联保贷款机制可改善宜城"四基同创"模式下家庭农场的融资困境。

Financing difficulties of new agricultural management entities has restricted the healthy development of China＇s agricultural production and agricultural modernization. By taking the following factors like group features, performance incentive intensity, sanctions against contract breach, natural risks and market risks of new agricultural management enti- ties into account,this study constructs a group loan Multitask Principal-agent Game analyt- ical framework, and attempts to analyze how banks try to solve their financial difficulties by translating incentives mechanism and sanctions against contract breach into effective con- straints between bank and new agricultural management entities. The results show that： ef- fective sanctions costs and incentive degree are effective restraints to carry out group loans of new agricultural management entities; bank can design incentive mechanism which can meet the different needs of new agricultural management entities in line of credit, rate of in- terest,loan period, and financial services;it is a good way to solve financial difficulties by combining financial services and agricultural insurance;the sample study of Yicheng city shows that it is a good way to solve financial difficulties of family farms by group loan mechanism under ＂four base Genesis＂.