胡塞尔的意向对象与时间的双重关系——对意识现象学所面临的困难的解读

The Dual Relationship Between Husserl's Noema and Time——A Reading of Difficulty Confronting Phenomenology of Consciousness

胡塞尔现象学中意向对象与时间的关系主要表现为两层:意向对象在时间中的构造和意向对象在时间中的显现。意向对象在时间中的构造中,胡塞尔采用了意向性视域、横意向性时间、被动综合、直观、本能等概念进行阐释。因为直观与被动综合形成的意向性视域总是处于相互论证的循环之中,所以胡塞尔没有办法在意向对象的时间构造中保持其本身的同一性。而且,他用设置本能的方式来作为意向性对象的构造动力,是对意识现象学大厦的一个威胁。因为这已经是用意识以外来的东西解释意识,而非从绝对意识出发来解释意向对象。在意向对象的时间显现方面,绝对的时间之流本身的显现总是与意向对象的时间显现处于相互论证的循环之中。且意向对象的时间性显现也被设置了一种动力性因素,有违现象学精神。所以从意向对象与时间的双重关系上能看到胡塞尔在发生现象学阶段一些论证上的较大的困难。

In Husserl＇s phenomenology,there exists dual relationship between Noema and time. Noemas are constructed in time and Noemas appear in time. Husserl explains the first relationship by intentional horizon,Querintentionalitat,passive synthesis,intuition and instinct. Because the intentional horizon which is formed by passive synthesis and intuition falls into a vicious circle,he cannot keep the identity in this relation. Furthermore,the way treating the instinct as the motive for constructing the Noema is a threat for the phenomenology,since he explains the consciousness by the thing out of it,which is against the principle of phenomenology. As for the second relation,the absolute temporal stream and the time of Noema fall into a vicious circle,in which their bases are from the other moment. Moreover,he set a motive factor for temporality of Noema,which is against the phenomenological spirit. Difficulties arise for Husserl in his argumentation of genetic phenomenology.