大股东参与定增新解:市值管理亦或股价操纵

Controlling Shareholders' Investment in Private Placement:Market Value Management or Price Manipulation?

本文以2006至2015年间全部已完成定向增发的公司为样本研究发现,大股东无论以何种方式参与,均有较好的宣告效应。但是,只有当大股东以并购重组型资产参与时才能显著提升公司长期会计收益实现市值管理,而以现金和其他资产参与时则没有显著的市值管理效用。本文的研究意味着,大股东注入重组型资产有助于公司的价值创造和价值实现,符合市值管理的目标。而大股东以现金或其他非现金资产参与则更可能是短期股价操纵的一个掩护,亟待进一步的监管和规范。

Using Chinese firms completing their private investment in public equity（PIPE） during 2006-2015 as sample,we find that the short-term market reaction to the controlling shareholder＇s investment in PIPE is positive and significant. Detail examination shows： when controlling shareholder invests in PIPE,only material asset reorganization type PIPE exhibits better short-term return and long-term accounting performance; other merge and acquisition PIPE only has better short-term market reaction; while cash placement type is indifferent compared to PIPEs without controlling shareholder. We interpret the results as controlling shareholder may expropriate minor shareholder through certain types of PIPE and the government should enforce more transparent disclosure to protect investors.