委托代理视野下的地方政府行为变异原因及其矫正

Causes of the abnormality of the local government actions in the principal-agent perspective and its solutions

从现代官僚制建立以来,政府不同层级之间的矛盾和冲突就不断发生,政府行为变异现象也随之产生。现有研究认为地方政府行为变异是因为财政分权、制度缺陷以及机制误导等所致,而以委托—代理为分析工具,可以看出政府的价值引导偏差、行为预期误导以及关系模式紊乱才是政府行为变异更为根本的根源。政府职能转变、行政法律规则改进、政府绩效评估标准调整与协同监督机制完善等被认为是政府行为变异矫正的有效路径。因此,需要从央地关系、法律规范、评估机制、监督机制层面入手,完善地方政府治理结构,实现政府有效治理。

Since the establishment of modern bureaucracy, contradictions and conflicts among governments at different levels have continued to emerge, one of whose consequences is the abnormality of the government actions. The existing studies suggest that the abnormality of the local government originates from some fiscal decentralization, institutional defects and misleading mechanisms. Using the principal - agent as the analysis tool, this paper concludes that the misleading government guidance in value orientation, the misleading expectations of the government actions and the disorder of the relationship between the central and the local govern- ment are the root causes. The solutions include the transformation of government functions, the improvement of the administrative rules and laws, the proper adjustment of the evaluation standards for government performance and the improvement of the supervi- sory mechanism of collaboration. Thus, the effective local governance relies on the improvement of the relationship between the central and the local governments, better laws and regulations, and workable evaluation and monitoring mechanisms.