企业技术创新行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Enterprises' Technological Innovation Action

文章基于演化博弈理论,对企业之间技术创新的选择问题以及政府与企业之间的技术创新战略选择问题进行了研究,首先从对称和不对称两个角度,对企业之间的技术创新行为进行演化博弈分析,得出了规模相当和不同规模的企业在进行技术创新时应采用的策略组合。一般而言,大企业应采用自主创新战略,积极创新,而小企业则适宜进行模仿创新战略;如果能够得到政府的资助,企业更要增强创新意识,以获得更多的政府资助,形成一个良性循环。同时,文章还对政府和企业之间的技术创新行为进行演化博弈分析,从长期看,无论企业大小最终都会进行技术创新,因此政府应加大对企业特别是中小企业的技术创新资助,并提出政府激励企业技术创新的建议,以实现政府和企业技术创新的互动发展。

The article applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the choices of technical innovation among enterprises, and the choices between governments and the enterprises. Firstly, from two symmetric and asymmetric angles, the article analyzes technological innovation actions among the enterprises with the evolutionary game theory, and comes to a conclusion that the same-size and various-size enterprises should use strategies. In general, large enterprises should adopt the strategy of independent innovation, positive innovation,and small enterprise is suitable for imitation innovation strategy. If the government funded enterprises, enterprises should enhance the awareness of innovation, in order to get more government funding, forming a virtuous circle. Then, the article analyzes technological innovation actions between the enterprises and the government by the evolutionary game theory as well. From a long-term point of view,enterprises, regardless size, will eventually choose to carry out technological innovation. Therefore, the government should encourage the technological innovation of enterprises, especially for small and medium-sized enterprise financing. There are also suggestions for the government to encourage enterprise technology innovation, so as to realize the interaction between the government and the enterprise technology innovation development.