公司产权性质、经理管理防御与高质量审计需求

Company Property Rights,Managerial Entrenchment and the Demand for High Quality Audit

以2008-2014年中国上市企业为样本,本文考察不同产权性质下经理管理防御对高质量审计需求的影响。研究发现,在国有企业中,经理管理防御对高质量审计需求具有负向影响;而在民营企业中,经理管理防御则引发了高质量审计需求。进一步发现,在国有企业中,产品市场竞争与外部大股东持股均能显著抑制经理管理防御与高质量审计需求之间的负向关系;而在民营企业中,这两种外部治理机制均不具有显著的调节效应。本文提供了不同产权性质企业经理管理防御经济后果的证据,对进一步推进国有企业改革具有借鉴意义。

Using the data from the Chinese listed companies during the periods 2008-2014,the study examines the effects of managerial entrenchment on the demand for high quality audit among companies with different nature of property rights. The results show that managerial entrenchment has a negative effect on the demand for high quality audit in state-owned companies but in non-state-owned companies it leads to the demand for higher quality audit. The results also show that in state-owned companies both product market competition and ownership of outside blockholders have negative effects on the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the demand for high quality audit. However,none of the two corporate governance mechanism shows obvious effects in non-state-owned companies. The study provides evidence of the economic consequences of managerial entrenchment in the companies with different nature of property rights and has great significance for further promoting the reform of state-owned companies.