CEO背景特征、CEO薪酬与企业自愿性社会责任

CEO Characteristics,CEO Compensation and Corporate Voluntary Social Responsibility

为了验证高阶理论对于企业社会责任战略的适用性并指导企业社会责任实践,本文在定义企业自愿性社会责任的基础上,利用2013年上市公司数据实证检验了CEO背景特征、CEO薪酬特征对企业自愿性社会责任的影响以及两者的交互作用。研究结果表明:第一,CEO背景特征和CEO薪酬特征会影响企业自愿性社会责任,输出型职能背景、长任期、名校毕业的CEO会自愿承担更多的社会责任,较高的薪酬水平以及长期激励为主的薪酬结构对企业自愿性社会责任有正向影响,高阶理论适用于企业社会责任战略;第二,CEO背景特征和CEO薪酬制度对企业社会责任战略具有交互影响,CEO薪酬结构以长期激励为主时,CEO背景特征对企业自愿性社会责任的影响得到强化,CEO货币薪酬激励不足时,CEO背景特征对企业自愿性社会责任的影响得到弱化。为了提高CEO自愿履行社会责任的积极性,企业可以从CEO的选聘、激励和培养三方面着手,选聘具有输出型职能背景和良好教育背景的CEO,制定合理的薪酬制度(充分的货币薪酬激励以及长期激励为主的薪酬结构),通过薪酬和培养体系留住合适的CEO提高CEO的组织忠诚度,通过建立健全不同职能部门之间的沟通交流机制削弱职能部门的局限性,努力培养生产型职能背景CEO的社会责任意识。

In this paper, we defined the voluntary CSR. Using data of listed firms in 2013, we empirically analyzed the impact of the CEO characteristics and the CEO compensation on voluntary CSR. The main findings are as follows. First, the CEO characteristics affect the voluntary CSR. Second; the long-term incentive-based compensation structure and adequate monetary compensation incentive would not only directly improve the level of voluntary CSR, but also strengthen the role of CEO characteristics on promoting voluntary CSR. In the CSR practices, the interaction of CEO characteristics and CEO compensation system must he taken into consideration. In order to mobilize the enthusiasm of CEO, the enterprises must ensure the reasonableness of CEO compensation system, namely thedong-term incentive-based compensation structure and adequate monetary compen; sation incentive.