不同价格模式下零售商双渠道策略研究

A Study of Dual-channels for Retailers with Different Pricing Schemes

在考虑单一制造商与单一零售商的双渠道供应链中,采用Stackelberg博弈法,研究了集中式决策与分散式决策中渠道竞争程度与零售商和制造商的价格和利润之间的关系.研究发现竞争程度的增加对价格和各方利润具有促进作用,且在销售价格不一致的情况下,集中决策下渠道总利润比分散决策下零售商与制造商的最优利润之和更大,在实际情况中,零售商和制造商更愿意选择分散式决策.

The paper considers a dual-channel supply chain containing one manufacturer and one retailer. The method of the Stackelberg game is adopted to analyze competition relationship with optimal profit and optimal pricing of manufacturer and retailer in centralized and decentralized decision-making processes. The study reveals that the increase of the degree of competition has a promoting effect on price and profit, and in conditions of inconsistencies in the sales price, the total channel profit under a centralized decision-making scheme is greater than the optimal profits of retailers and manufacturers combined under the decentralized decision-making scheme. In actual situations, retailers and manufacturers are more willing to choose decentralized decision-making.