两权分离、内部控制效率与债务融资

Two Rights Separation,Internal Control Efficiency and Debt Financing

家族企业的两权分离容易引发终极控股人的掏空动机,放大了家族企业与债权人之间的代理问题。研究发现,两权分离度大的家族企业会获得更少的长期借款,而短期借款能够有效抑制内部人的掠夺行为,所以两权分离没有给家族企业的短期借款融资带来不利影响;内部控制是债权人的利益保护机制,内部控制质量的提高有助于家族企业获得更多的短期借款,支持了家族企业完善内部控制的有用性。建立市场导向、高效而富有弹性的金融体系的金融改革目标,将推动信贷资源配置市场化,商业银行将逐步建立审慎的经营机制和良好的风险内控机制,债务人有必要完善内部控制等类似的债权人利益保护机制,以利于保持持续的资金来源,促进企业发展。

Separation of two rights in Family Firms will lead to final share holders' motivation of tunneling and magnify the agent problem between family firms and creditors. It is found that family firms with significant problem of two rights separation will obtain less long- term credit,the short- term credit will effectively restrain insiders' plunder behavior,and two right separation will not bring short-term credit of family firms with adverse impact;internal control is a kind of interests protection mechanism of creditors,and the quality improvement of internal control will be helpful for family firms to obtain more shortterm credit,and provide family firms with more support in perfecting the usefulness of internal control. Setting reform target of market- oriented,effective and flexible financial system will promote the marketization of credit resources distribution;commercial banks will gradually formulate the prudent operation mechanism and sound risk control mechanism;creditors should perfect the interests protection mechanism to maintain sustainable capital resources and promote enterprises development.