摘要
The article focuses on the difference between strategic rhetoric and philosophical conversation. It first tries to distinguish between sophistical manipulation and valid strategic argumentation. In order to do that, the author tries to give a new meaning to the old Aristotelian tripartition between logos, ethos, and pathos. Then, he uses Chaim Perelman＇s theory of argumentation to show that the standard of rationality in practical reasoning is a specific one. After having clarified the very concept of strategic argumentation, the author distinguishes it from the notion of philosophical conversation. He tries to show that if the latter is completely replaced by the former, the danger exists that victimization and morals ＂a la carte＂ will generate a defeat of critical thought.
The article focuses on the difference between strategic rhetoric and philosophical conversation. It first tries to distinguish between sophistical manipulation and valid strategic argumentation. In order to do that, the author tries to give a new meaning to the old Aristotelian tripartition between logos, ethos, and pathos. Then, he uses Chaim Perelman＇s theory of argumentation to show that the standard of rationality in practical reasoning is a specific one. After having clarified the very concept of strategic argumentation, the author distinguishes it from the notion of philosophical conversation. He tries to show that if the latter is completely replaced by the former, the danger exists that victimization and morals ＂a la carte＂ will generate a defeat of critical thought.
