高校课程实施中的“共谋现象”解析

An Analysis of “Collusion Phenomenon” in the Process of Universities Curriculum Implementation

高校课程实施与管理中存在"共谋现象"。校内层级间信息不对称是其存在的组织环境,上级检查与监督具有惩罚与奖励的压力是共谋现象存在的内在动力,利益共同体的存在、冲突的有限性,使共谋成为痼疾。进一步分析发现:上级分配资源的有限性与对下级要求无限性的矛盾,是共谋行为产生的制度基础。学校规章执行主体的基本利益与自身角色利益的冲突,使得规章的有效执行必然会受到利益分配格局的影响和制约,学校科层组织结构特有的"慈父主义心态"也在一定程度上助长了共谋行为的合理化。

There is a ＂collusion phenomenon＂existing in the process of universities＇ curriculum implementation and management. Information asymmetry in the campus hierarchy is its organizational environment,the pressure of punishment and reward from higher inspection and supervision is its intrinsic motivation,the existence of community interest and the limitation of the conflict make the conspiracy as an obstinate illness. Further analysis showed that： limited allocating resource from superior as well as infinitely requirements to subordinate comes to a contradiction and that is the institutional basis of collusion behavior. There is a conflict between the interest of main executors and the interest of role orientation themselves,the pattern of interest distribution will be restricted and influenced by the effect of rules＇ implement,and the bureaucratic structure＇s unique ＂fatherly mentality＂in schools has partly connived the rationalization of collusion.