高管晋升激励与财务重述——基于强度和概率的视角

Managerial Promotion and Annual Report Restatement——Based on the Perspectives of Incentive Strength and Probability

利用2008-2013年中国上市公司的相关数据,采用混合样本、配对样本,研究了高管晋升激励对财务重述的影响。研究结果表明:高管晋升激励能够产生应有的激励效应,减少财务重述的发生;区分财务重述类型后,高管晋升激励对核心重述、非核心重述均能产生抑制作用;从CEO变更来看,发生CEO变更当年晋升激励对财务重述的抑制作用明显要比没有发生CEO变更的年份弱;从继任CEO的来源来看,继任CEO来自公司内部的高管晋升激励对财务重述的抑制作用明显要比继任CEO来自外部的公司强。

This paper employs Chinese listed companies data from 2008 to 2013,using pool sample and matching sample to analyze managerial tournament incentive impact on annual report restatement. The results show：（i） tournament incentive can stimulate managers to decrease annual report restatement occurrence.（ii） considering types of annual report restatement,tournament can decrease both core restatement and non-core restatement.（iii） considering CEO turnover,at the year of turnover,tournament incentive effect is weaker than that of the year without turnover happening.（iv） considering successor CEO source,tournament incentive effect is weaker when the successive CEO comes from external,in contrast with internal successor.