政府审计的分析框架探讨

Research on the Theoretical Framework for Government Audit

运用经济学的理论方法分析政府审计问题一般采用委托代理框架,但其在分析单一权威制下政府审计问题时存在一定的局限性。本文基于国家治理的现实需要,运用"治理域""科层控制""政策指令覆盖度""剩余控制权"等概念范畴,初步构建了分权模式下纳入政府审计的基本模型架构。这一框架的核心问题是地方政府在"生存约束"和"认可激励"下追求自身利益最大化,从而与委托代理框架的参与约束与激励相容约束有所区别。最后在构建的框架中探讨了政府审计对财政分权制度、地方官员考核制度的互补性,进一步揭示了政府审计的治理功能。

he principal-agent economic framework is mainly applied to the analysis of government audit, but it is difficult to accurately depict the interaction between central and local governments. Based on the governance demand, this paper tries to put forward conceptual framework including ＂governance domain＂, ＂control on the section level＂ ,＂ coverage of policies and orders＂ and ＂residual rights of control＂. The framework＇ s key question lies on the interest maximization of the subordinate government under the survival constraint and incentive from the upper level government, which differentiates it from the participating and encouraging constraints under the principal-agent framework. By applying the theoretical framework mentioned above, the paper analyzes the institutional complementarity between government audit, and financial decentralization and local official appraisal system.