摘要
对直觉(Intuition)的关注一直是西方哲学的重要维度,传统观点把直觉看作知识的重要基础和评判标准,直觉方法更被看作是哲学特有的优先方法。但是"直觉是什么?直觉是否具有证据意义?以直觉为方法的传统哲学是否合理?"三个问题却并没有得到很好的解释,它们构成了当前哲学界尤其是知识论领域直觉探讨的焦点。基于当前自然主义与传统直觉辩护者在这些问题上的争论,论文认为传统直觉观点的核心问题是过分解读直觉的可信赖性,而过强的自然主义则威胁到了哲学的自主性和权威性。主张采用一种"最低限度的"自然主义来维系二者之间的张力,从而尝试为哲学提供经验的基础,同时丰富哲学论证的方式。
The problem of intuition is an important aspect of western philosophy. A traditional view is that intuition is an important foundation and criterion of knowledge, so the method of intuition is unique for philosophy. But what is an intuition? Is it a proof? Is the traditional philosophy based on the method of intuition? These questions are still open, and become the focus of epistemology. From the argument on the questions, I hold the opinion that the weakness of traditional view is a too-much position on the reliability of intuition, on the other hand, the stranger naturalism threats the autonomy and authority. I propose a minimum naturalism as experienced foundation to balance the tension and to add the method of philosophy.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期41-47,共7页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目"当代知识论的系列研究"(项目编号:14ZDB012)
关键词
直觉
自然主义
证据
Intuition
Naturalism
Evidence