生物物种是自然类吗?

Are Biological Species Natural Kinds?

物种是进化生物学与生物分类学的核心概念,但是有关物种的本性和本体论地位问题引起巨大争议。按照传统的本质论,物种是拥有本质的自然类,但本质论的困难是它与进化论不相容。根据物种个体论,物种不是自然类而是个体,但个体论的困难是难以解释生物有机体与物种之间的部分-整体关系。多元实在论主张物种可以是非本质论意义上的自然类,其问题是物种多元论与物种实在论不能结合。新本质主义(包括HPC和关系本质主义)认为物种可看成拥有新本质的自然类,其问题在于这些"新"本质缺乏传统本质的说明功能,因而不能算作真正的本质主义。本文建议我们可以采用一种动力学系统理论来解释物种和自然类,由此物种作为自然类的传统地位可以得到保留。

Species is a core concept of evolutionary biology and biological taxonomy, but there are huge controversies on the nature and ontological status of biological species. According to traditional essentialism, species are natural kinds with essence, but the problem is that species essentialism is incompatible with theory of evolution. The Species-as-Individual Thesis claims that species are not natural kinds but individuals, but it is difficult for this thesis to explain the part-whole relation between biological organisms and species. Pluralistic realism argues that biological species can be natural kinds in non-essentialist sense, yet the problem is that species pluralism cannot be combined with species realism. New essentialism, including HPC and relational essentialism, supposes that biological species could be treated as natural kinds with new essence. The defects of new essentialism are that these ＂new＂ essences lack explanatory function which traditional essences have, and for this reason new essentialism cannot be seen as real essentialism. In this paper, the author suggests that we can employ dynamical systems theory to explain biological species and natural kinds. According to this approach, the traditional status of species as natural kinds can be preserved.