摘要
从委托—代理关系理论出发,创新性地提出国有资产管理中存在全体人民与全国人民代表大会、全国人民代表大会与国有资产监督管理委员会、国有资产监督管理委员会与国有资本投资运营公司、国有资本投资运营公司与国有企业四重委托—代理关系的生成机制及法理基础,并逐层探究四重委托—代理关系引发的问题及解决机制,提出顶层构建一元终极所有者、中间层塑造人格化积极股东、底层实行市场化运作、国有资产红利分配的系统解决机制。
Based on principal-agent theory, this paper innovatively puts forward the quadruple principal-agent relationships in state-owned Asset management, analyzes its generative mechanism and legal basis, and explores the inner contradictions and the settlement mechanism. This paper thus provides a systematic mechanism focusing on building unitary and ultimate ownership on the top, shaping active shareholders with personification in the middle, implementing market-oriented operation at the bottom, and realizing bonus-sharing from state-owned Asset. The paper systematically designs four kinds of mixed ownership enterprises and its management strategy of state-owned Asset, and deeply deplores five core mechanisms in the innovation of the models of state-owned Asset management.
作者
王曙光
徐余江
WANG Shuguang XU Yujiang
出处
《中共中央党校学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期96-102,共7页
Journal of The Party School of The Central Committee of The C.T.C
关键词
混合所有制经济
国有资产管理
委托—代理理论
Mixed Ownership Economy, Management of State-owned Asset, Principal-agent Theory