腐败、不作为与激励设计——基于社会福利和个人利益最大化视角

Corruption,Nonfeasance and Incentive Design:the Perspective of Maximizing the Social Welfare and the Personal Interests

完善激励制度是提高公共部门绩效、降低腐败、减少不作为的关键。在信息不对称条件下,腐败和不作为是公共部门中每个人的可能选择;而组织无法直接观测到每个人每一选择的成本和收益,进而无法判断和预测其可能的选择,因此无法对其实现有效激励。但是,考虑到个人的选择是基于自身利益最大化原则,就可以基于对绩效收益、可能的腐败与不作为收益所进行的权衡而做出激励制度的相应抉择。本研究基于个人利益最大化的行为,通过权衡相关社会福利得失构建模型,进而完成公共部门的激励制度设计。

To improve the incentive system is the key to improve public sector performance,lower corruption and reduce nonfeasance.Under the condition of information asymmetry,corruption and nonfeasance may be the choice of everyone in the public sector,while the organizations in the public sector cannot directly observe the cost and benefit of everyone＇s choices,thus are unable to judge and predict the possible choices,hence are unable to realize effective motivation.However,considering that the personal choice is based on the principle of self-benefit maximization,we can balance through weighing the performance gains,possible corruption and nonfeasance earnings to improve the incentive system.Using the behavior of personal interest maximization,and we construct a model through balancing the relevant social welfare gains and losses to complete the incentive system design of the public sector.