交叉上市、增长机会与股利政策——基于政府干预假说的检验

Cross-listings,Growth Opportunities and Dividend Policy:A Test Based on Government Intervention Hypothesis

尽管交叉上市领域中主流的绑定假说获得了大量检验,但该假说是否适用于非美国国家或地区尚需进一步考察,其在解释交叉上市与公司股利政策的关系上尚存在逻辑上的不一致。本文基于中国H+A交叉上市的历史背景以及政府干预假说,推断H+A交叉上市公司由于更多的政府干预而具有更低的增长机会、更低的现金股利支付水平与支付意愿。基于2007-2014年期间的5602个非平衡面板数据,研究结果完全支持本文假设。在采用干预效应模型、双元Probit模型、倾向得分匹配与偏差修正匹配等方法控制了样本选择偏差与内生性之后,研究假设仍然得到良好的支持。进一步研究发现,H+A公司具有更大的过度投资概率、更低的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性和更低的高管变更-业绩敏感性,这加强了本文的政府干预假说。

Although bonding hypothesis which is prevailing in the research area of cross - listings has received a great many tests, it is necessary to further investigate whether it is applied to the cases of non - US countries or areas. Based on the historical context of Chinese H ＋ A cross - listings and hypothesis of government intervention, we confer that H ＋ A companies have lower growth opportunities, less dividend pay - out ratio, and lower willingness of dividend payment, due to greater intervention from government. With 5602 observations of unbalanced panel data from 2007 to 2014, the empirical results support our hypothesis completely. Even after controlling the problem of sample selection bias and endogeneity with the methods of treatment effect model, bivariate probit model, propensity score matching, and bias - corrected matching, our results remain robust. Further investigation also shows that H ＋ A companies have greater likelihood to over - invest, lower sensitivity between compensation of top 3 board directors and firm performance, and lower sensitivity between CEO turnover and performance, which strengthens the government intervention hypothesis that serves as the foundation of this paper.