技术研发联盟关系性资产投入的股权激励机制研究

Study on Equity Incentive Mechanism for Relational Assets Investment of R & D Alliance

技术研发联盟由于信息不对称、有限理性等约束导致联盟企业间的契约必然是不完全的契约,这种不完全契约引发联盟成员出现机会主义行为而减少关系性资产投入;分析了联盟成员通过持有股权来分享联盟利益形成双边依赖关系以促进联盟成员间的激励相容,通过建立联盟成员与联盟盟主的股权激励机制模型,求解得到最优的关系性资产投入以及最优股权,并分析了相关参数对于关系性资产以及股权激励的影响作用,最后给出了相关建议。

Because of the constraints such as the information asymmetry,bounded rationality and so on in technology RD alliances,the contract between the alliance members is not a complete contract and this kind of incomplete contract leads to the opportunism behaviors in the alliance members so that relational assets investment is reduced.This paper analyzes that the alliance members share the alliance interests by holding equities to form bilateral dependence relation in order to promote the incentive compatibility between the alliance members. By setting up the equity incentive mechanism model between an alliance leader and alliance members,the optimal relational assets investment and the optimal equity are obtained by solving the model. The effect of the relevant parameters on the relational assets investment and equity incentive is also analyzed,and finally,the related suggestions are given.