中央政府与地方政府建设用地管理中的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Land Management Between Central Government and Local Government

针对中国城镇建设用地快速扩张带来的问题,需要构建中央政府和地方政府土地政策的良性互动。采用演化博弈论的方法,构建中央政府和地方政府的损益变量、支付函数与动态稳定模型,得出了相应的结论。中央政府需要积极利用先进技术,降低监管成本,同时要对地方政府的土地利用行为相机进行奖励或者处罚,保持正确的政策引导;推动土地政务公开,完善社会监督和舆论监督;通过改革财税机制与创新驱动战略,从根本上解决对土地财政的依赖,从而提高土地集约节约利用水平。

The problem brought about by the rapid expansion of urban construction land in China requires positive interaction upon land policy between central government and local government. Through the evolutionary game theory, the profit and loss variables, the payment function and the dynamic stability model of the central government and local government axe constructed, and the corresponding conclusion is drawn. The central government shall reduce regulatory costs by actively using advanced technology, and maintain the correct policy guidance at the same time by making contingent reward or punishment according to the local government＇s land use behavior; it shall improve social supervision and public supervision by promoting government land affairs public and through the reform of fiscal and taxation system and innovation driven strategy, it shall solve the land finance dependence fundamentally, thus improve the level of land intensive utilization.