摘要
董事高管责任保险的引入能否提升公司治理效果,目前存在机会主义假说和外部监督假说两种截然相反的观点。文章以银行信贷决策为切入点,首先考察不同的审计意见如何影响银行信贷决策,在此基础上重点考察董事高管责任保险对审计意见与银行信贷规模关系的调节作用,以检验董事高管责任保险的治理效应。研究显示,与获得标准审计意见的公司相比,那些获得非标审计意见的公司,其次年新增的银行信贷规模显著下降;更为重要的是,董事高管责任保险的购买强化了非标审计意见降低次年新增银行信贷规模的关系。上述结果表明,董事高管责任保险的引入向银行传递了机会主义的信号,导致银行做出了减少信贷规模的决策。
There are two opposite views about whether D ＆ O insurance can improve the governance effect, which are opportunism hypothesis and the external supervision hypothesis. This paper firstly examined how audit opinions affected bank credit decisions. Then we investigated the moderating effect of the D ＆ O insurance on the relationship between audit opinions and the bank loan scales to test D ＆ O insurance＇ s governance effects. The results showed that the following year＇ s bank loan would decrease significantly for those companies which had received non-stand- ard audit opinions. More importantly, D ＆ O insurance strengthened the negative correlation between non-standard audit opinions and decreased bank loans. These results indicated that D ＆ O insurance transmitted the opportunism signal which would cause the bank to reduce bank loans.
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第11期78-89,共12页
Insurance Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"中国上市公司D&O保险需求动因及其治理效应研究"(项目编号:71562010)
"不同稳健水平下企业的财务信息披露差异化研究"(项目批准号:71662009)
海南省自然科学基金项目"稳健机制下公司财务信息披露行为及其市场效应的研究"(项目编号:20157256)的资助
