正义的悖论——村民委员会选举中的“贿选”现象新解

The Paradox of Justice-New Interpretation of "Bribery" in the Election of Villagers' Committee

本文讨论了贿选的本质及其何以在农村选举中频频发生的原因,并揭示了贿选中所存在的正义性悖论。在农村的集体所有制下,由于集体成员权缺乏明晰的界定,村民并未获得独立而完整的集体资产决策权,村委会便取得了对集体可经营性资产的控制权。对于该资产租金的觊觎与争夺,构成了贿选及其竞争发生的根本原因。竞争性贿选实质上是集体可经营性资产租金的一种事前耗散。尽管竞争性贿选损害了村民选举的程序正义,但它有助于实现集体可经营性资产的收益在村民之间充分而又公平的分配,故体现了其实体正义。这种正义性兼得的难题,被本文称为"正义的悖论"。本文的阐释与分析,将有益于提出解决农村贿选问题的新的视角和思路,即通过减少集体可经营性资产的存量来削弱贿选的动机。

This paper focuses on the bribery existing in villager' s committee election and discusses the reason why it frequently happens and what the essence it is.Based on the analysis we find there's a justice paradox in such bribery.As the collective member right is ambiguous under Rural Collective Ownership,villagers' decision rights on collective assets are illusory.Villager' s committee has been the controlling shareholder of collective productive assets in fact.To get the rent derives from operating collective assets that allures the nominees to bribe at village election.Competitive bribery here in fact allocates the rent in advance.While competitive bribery has broken the procedure justice in villager' s election,it helps to realize the fair allocation of the profit of collective productive assets in villagers,and this reflects the justice of entity.This is what this paper calls the justice paradox.Based on this analysis,we try to put forward a new solution to solve the bribery at villager' s election,and that is to diminish collective productive assets.