非对称信息下再制造产品质量控制决策研究

Remanufacturing Products Quality Control Strategy Under the Condition of Asymmetric Information

本文研究了风险中性的单再制造商与单销售商构建的二级闭环供应链模型,基于博弈论和委托代理理论。在不同回收水平下,再制造商都存在单边道德风险,销售商根据影响再制造商质量预防水平的因素来引导再制造商的决策,并制定激励契约来降低再制造商的道德风险,以达到闭环供应链协调的目的。研究表明:回收水平和质量检测水平均影响再制造商的质量预防水平,回收水平同质量预防水平呈正相关,质量检测水平同质量预防水平呈负相关;在不同回收水平下,通过销售商质量检测控制后,闭环供应链收益增加,同时求得最优控制水平和最优契约金额。在最后,通过算例分析验证了契约的有效性。

This paper based on game theory and principal-agent theory,studies a risk-neutral remanufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer in the closed-loop supply chain.Under different recovery level,the remanufacturer presents the unilateral moral risk,retailer according the products quality inspection level to guiding remanufacturer＇s strategy and making incentive contracts to reducing the unilateral moral risk of remanufacturer for coordinating closed-loop supply chain.The study shows that：recovery level and quality inspection level both has influence on remanufacturing products quality prevention level,recovery level was positively correlated with remanufacturing products quality prevention level and quality inspection level is negatively correlated with remanufacturing products quality prevention level.Under different recovery level,after the retailer＇s quality control strategy,the closed-loop has significantly improvement.At the same time,we find the optimum solution of control level and incentive contracts cost.In the end,we demonstrate the quality incentive contracts is effective.