保理融资下数量折扣契约设计

Modeling Quantity Discounts under Factoring Financing

站在中小供应商视角,首次尝试将保理融资考虑进数量折扣契约,探讨价格敏感性需求环境中的契约协调问题。模型以供应商、制造商、银行利润上涨为目标建立,主体间的博弈假设信息完全,采用逆推归纳法分析。研究发现:模型的解存在,任一折扣率,都存在唯一对应的折扣点和批量生产/采购倍数,说明供应商、制造商、银行都能实现利润上涨;对供应商来说,保理融资的成本远远低于因提前获得资本带来的收益;当需求具有价格敏感性时,供应商采取保理融资和数量折扣相结合的策略能增大需求量、确保帕累托最优交易、同时增大交易额、盘活应收账款。

From the standpoint of SME, this study first tries to introduce factoring financing into the quantity diseount contract and discusses the coordination mechanism when the demand is sensitive to price.On the assumption that supplier, manufacturer and bank would gain more profit, we establish the coordination model, and use Backwards Induction to analyze the game. The analytic results suggest that the solution for the model exists, which means that supplier, manu- facturers and banks could all gain more profit. The cost of factoring financing is much lower than the profit of receiving investment ahead of time. The combination tactic of factoring financing and quantity discount will bring suppliers more demand, also guarantee the Pareto optimal trade, and revitalize the account receivable.