摘要
创新生态系统遵循于自组织进化,其理论支持者认为实现多方共赢是系统进化的必然结果,但是最新研究已经对此提出质疑,创新生态系统也可能向失败的方向进化。目前,该问题尚缺乏系统的理论支撑与检验。传统的创新生态系统研究以核心企业为主导,忽视了企业合作态度或参与动机对系统进化的影响,而事实上企业间的合作行为也表现出资源依赖型关系,从而实现创新主体地位均等时的合作创新。本文基于演化博弈模型,以资源依赖型关系分析创新生态系统中核心企业与配套企业种群合作创新的自组织进化过程。考虑合作创新的参与动机,将企业行为分为"互惠型合作"与"机会型合作"策略,并结合技术溢出、合作契约等影响合作稳定性的决策要素,分析了创新生态系统的进化机制。通过模型分析与数值仿真发现:合作态度或参与动机影响着系统进化的效率与趋势;技术溢出损失增大时不利于企业间形成稳定的合作关系,企业倾向于选择"机会型合作"策略,使系统向低效率状态进化;提高合作契约的违约惩罚或增加创新资金投入均有利于促进企业间的合作创新,企业倾向于选择"互惠型合作"策略,使系统向充分合作方向进化并实现多方共赢。本文研究引入了资源依赖型关系合作视角,使创新生态系统的自组织进化机制得以初步诠释,进而为企业创新决策及创新生态系统的治理提供理论支持。
The innovation ecosystem is based on self-organized evolution, and its theoretical supporters believe that all-win achievement is the inevitable result of system evolution, but recent studies have challenged the conclusion and show that innovation ecosystem may evolve to a failed status. At present, there is a lack of systematic theory support and test of this issue. Previous studies of innovation ecosystem have suggested that focus firms are the determinant factors affecting system evolution,and neglect the effects of firm cooperative attitudes or participation motivation on system evolution. In fact, firms' cooperative behavior also shows the resource dependence relationship to carry out cooperative innovation of bodies with equal status. Based on evolutionary game model, this paper analyzes the self-organized evolutionary process of cooperative innovation between focus firms and supporting enterprise communities in innovation ecosystem through resource dependence relationship. Taking participation motivation for cooperative innovation into account, it divides firm behavior into reciprocal cooperation and opportunistic cooperation strategies, and explores the evolutionary mechanism of innovation ecosystem by combining with technology spillover, cooperative contract etc. Through model analysis and numerical simulation, it comes to the conclusions as follows: firstly, cooperative attitude or participation motivation affect the efficiency and trend of system evolution; secondly, when the increase in losses of technology spillover is harmful to the formation of stable cooperative relationship among firms, and firms tend to select the opportunistic cooperation strategy, leading to the system evolution toward low efficiency; thirdly, the rise in penalties for breaches of cooperative contracts or the increase in innovation capital input are beneficial to the promotion of cooperative innovation among firms, and firms tend to select the reciprocal cooperation strategy, leading to the system evolution toward complete cooperation and all-win achievement. This paper introduces the perspective of resource dependence relationship cooperation, gives a preliminary explanation of selforganized evolution mechanism of innovation ecosystem, and thereby provides theoretical support for firm innovation decisions and the governance of innovation ecosystem.
出处
《外国经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第12期59-73,128,共16页
Foreign Economics & Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL011)
广东省自然科学基金项目(2014A030310247)
关键词
创新生态系统
合作创新
演化博弈
资源依赖型关系
演化稳定策略
innovation ecosystem
cooperative innovation
evolutionary game
resource dependence relationship
evolutionary stable strategy