房地产经纪机构失信应对的演化博弈

Countermeasures to Real Estate Brokerage Agencies Dishonesty Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

文章运用演化博弈理论分析房地产经纪机构失信演化途径,探讨房地产经纪机构与消费者在信息传递前和信息传递后两种博弈情况下的演化均衡策略。通过演化博弈模型发现:消费者交易后的信息传递对房地产经纪机构失信具有抑制作用,若消费者不能有效传递交易信息,即便有各种监督,经纪机构还是稳定趋向于失信;消费者交易后的信息只有得到广泛传递时,才能降低房地产经纪机构的机会主义收益。文章最后提出三个建议:建立消费者与房地产经纪机构交易评价机制,在已有信用平台上披露交易评价信息,利用互联网广泛传递交易信息以提升房地产经纪机构失信的应对效果。

By using the evolutionary game theory, this article analyzed the evolution paths of the real estate brokerage agencies＇ discredit, and discussed the strategies of evolutionary equilibrium between the real estate brokerage agencies and consumers before and after information transmission. By evolutionary game model, we found that after consumers finishing transactions, the information transmission can restrain real estate brokerage agencies＇ discredit, however, if consumers can＇t transmit information effectively- regardless of various supervision -the real estate brokerage agencies will also certainly tend to perform discredit; only information be transmitted widely, the real estate brokerage agencies＇ opportunistic benefits and the cost of information transmission can be reduced. Finally, this article put forward three suggestions to improve the effect of dealing with the real estate brokerage agencies＇ discredit： first, establish trading evaluation mechanism on consumers and the real estate brokerage agencies; second, disclose trading evaluation information in the existing credit platform ; third, use the Internet to widely transmit transaction information.