信贷歧视、青年创业群体与互保信贷模式

Credit Discrimination, Youth Entrepreneurship Group and the Credit Model of Mutual Insurance

通过构建一个基于互保制度不存在情况下的银行信贷选择的理论模型,揭露银行对于青年创业者的信贷偏向。进而建立一个基于随机组合情况下的互保信贷模型,发现随机组合的互保机制反而不如普通信贷模式。运用此理论模型重点分析欺诈不存在和存在的互保信贷机制,得出如下的结论:创业者欺诈意愿不存在的情况下,银行给优质小组和混合小组的借贷成本应该让他们项目的经济利润近似于零,违约连带还款额接近投资项目的总收益。创业者欺诈意愿存在的情况下,在具有完善的合作约束和激励约束的前提下,银行应该对任一创业群体互保小组一视同仁,给予相同的贷款利率。同时,一旦小组成员违约,银行对承担责任的创业者抽贷行为不应该出于惩罚目的。

First of all, the paper constructs a theoretical model of the selection of bank credit without mutual insurance system, to expose the banks＇ lending bias for young entrepreneurs. This paper further established a credit model of mutual insurance based on random combination. However, it turns out that the random combination of the mutual mechanism is not as good as the ordinary credit model. Then, the authors apply this theory model to selectively analyze the credit mechanism of mutual insurance with frauds and the mechanism without frauds. The model logic of this paper supports the following conclusions： without the intention of frauds of entrepreneurs, the borrowing cost that bank gives the high-quality group and the mixed group should make their economic profits approximate to zero, and make the amount of repayment for breaking contracts also close to the amount of investment projects. With the intention of frauds of entrepreneurs, under the presupposition of perfect cooperation constraints and incentive restraints, banks should treat any mutual insurance groups of youth entrepreneurship equally without discrimination, with the same loan interest rates. At the same time, once any member of the group breaks a contract, the taking credit behaviors of banks on the entrepreneur should not be for the purpose of punishment.