会计观念、薪酬契约与管理层决策行为——会计准则变革非预期效应的经验证据

Accounting Concept,Compensation Contract,and Management Decision-making Behavior——The Empirical Evidence of Unintended Consequences of Accounting Standards Reforms

会计准则变革不仅影响财务报告和资本市场,其带来的会计观念转变也将引起企业经营理念的变化,从而影响管理层的决策行为。本文分析了会计观念转变对高管薪酬契约的影响及由此带来的管理层经营理念及决策行为的变化,并以2003-2013年我国A股上市公司的数据进行检验。研究发现,会计准则变革后,净利润与高管薪酬的敏感性显著下降,而净资产与高管薪酬的敏感性显著上升,这反映出随着会计观念由收入费用观向资产负债观的转变,管理者在经营理念和决策行为上也更注重资产价值管理和资本增值,进一步分析发现,这种转变在会计敏感度高的公司和国有控股的公司中更为明显。本研究对于全面评估会计准则变革的效应,拓展会计准则变革的非预期效应研究有着重要的价值。

This paper analyzes the changes in the accounting concept of the executive compensation contract and the resulting changes in the management philosophy and the impact of decision-making behavior.After the reform of accounting standards,the sensitivity of net profit and executive compensation is significantly decreased,but the sensitivity of net assets and executive compensation increased significantly,which reflects that with the change of accounting philosophy from the Asset-Liability View to Revenue-Expense View,managers pay more attention to asset value management and capital appreciation in the business philosophy and decision-making behavior.This shift in the enterprises with high accounting sensitivity and the state-owned holding companies is more obvious.