摘要
我国长期以来的金融抑制,导致了P2P网络借贷平台在"监管真空"背景下的野蛮生长。近年来,以"e租宝"为代表的大量P2P网络借贷平台"集资诈骗"等恶性案件频发,敲响了行业监管的警钟。多部委联合出台的《网络借贷信息中介机构业务活动管理暂行办法》推出了一系列严格的监管措施,旨在对P2P领域的乱象加强法律治理。总体而言,《网络借贷管理办法》纳入了很多有益的监管创新,但仍需进一步完善。本文在借鉴美国、英国、韩国以及日本等国成熟的P2P网贷监管经验与立法模式的基础上,从博弈论角度对网络借贷各方之间的关系进行了分析,并提出未来我国对P2P网络借贷的监管应建立统一的P2P征信系统,引入投资者分层制度与信用保险制度,同时完善监管机构之间的沟通机制,以实现金融消费者利益保护这一核心制度目标。
P2P network lending platforms has achieved frantic growth in recent years under the "regulatory vacuum". The financial frauds conducted by these platforms like Ezubao alerted the regulatory authorities. A series of strict regulations are proposed in the "Interim Methods to Regulate the Network Lending" by multi-ministries to curb the violations and frauds in P2P lending. In general, the "Interim Methods" included a few regulatory innovations and still should be perfected. This paper studies the interactions among all the parties of network lending from a game-theoretical perspective with the experiences on regulating P2P lending in advanced market countries like America, Britain, Korea and Japan, and argues that China's P2P lending regulation should be based on constructing a unified credit rating system, introducing the tiered-investors system and credit insurance. To protect financial consumers, the communication mechanism between regulator authorities must be established.
出处
《金融监管研究》
2016年第11期92-106,共15页
Financial Regulation Research
基金
国家社科基金项目(15BFX118)"资本认缴登记制下<公司法>适用难点研究"