股权关联降低了企业间信贷的抵押要求吗——基于中国上市公司委托贷款数据的经验分析

Does Equity Connection Alleviate the Collateral Requirements of Loans between Firms——An Empirical Study Using Entrusted Loan Data from Listed Companies in China

本文以2004—2014年中国上市公司公告的委托贷款样本为研究对象，实证考察了股权关联对企业间信贷抵押要求的影响。研究发现，股权关联与抵押要求显著负相关，关联程度越大，信贷过程中要求抵押的概率越小。进一步的分析揭示出，股权关联对抵押要求的降低作用表现出丰富差异性：一方面，与整体经济资金趋紧时比，资金宽松时期股权关联对抵押的降低效应较大；另一方面，与金融市场化程度较高（法制环境较好）地区比，在金融市场化程度较低（法制环境较差）地区，股权关联对抵押施加的降低效应相对较大。而且，基于借贷距离的扩展性检验表明，股权关联通过其带来的信息控制优势降低了抵押要求。这些研究结果丰富了我们对企业集团内部借贷市场和股权关联这一关系机制的理解和认识。

Using a sample of entrusted loans of listed companies between 2004 and 2014, this paper empirically analyzes the effects of equity connection on the collateral requirements of business loans. It is found that equity connection between firms is significantly negative related to the re- quirements of collateral, and the deeper degree of equity connection, the less requirements of collat eral in loans. Further analysis show that equity connection has different effects on collateral under different conditions. In addition, the extended study based on the perspective of borrower-lender distance indicates that equity connection alleviates the requirements of collateral by means of infor- mation and control advantages. These findings enrich our understandings of intragroup loan market and equity connection in business group.