农产品质量检验检测服务的案例研究

Case Study of Agricultural Product Quality Inspection Service

农产品质量安全关系千家万户,是政府和社会关注焦点。信息不对称是引发农产品质量安全事件的重要因素之一。农产品质检服务可使农产品质量信息公开透明。通过静态博弈模型分析政府监管批发商和批发市场占优策略分别为"不重视农产品质量安全""不规范管理",但通过引入罚金和销售安全农产品的额外收益可改变批发市场和批发商占优策略。结合批发市场典型案例,分析政府监管下批发市场和批发商在质检服务中行为选择,结论与理论分析相符。通过政府有效监管,批发市场"规范管理",有利于农产品质量检验检测服务水平提高,保障农产品质量安全。

The safety of quality of agricultural products is critical to millions of households, and it isthe focal point of the government and the whole society, and the asymmetric information is a key factor thatcauses it to produce many problem. Agricultural product quality inspection service can make agriculturalproduct quality information open and transparent, and it happens in the process of circulation. Thewholesale market is the main channel of the distribution system of agricultural products. By using staticgame model, it could be found that dominant strategies of wholesalers and wholesale markets were ＂attachno importance to the safety of quality of agricultural products＂ and ＂non-standard management＂, under thegovernment supervision, but it could alter the dominant strategies of wholesalers and wholesale markets byfining and selling safe agricultural products to gain extra revenues. By utilizing the cases of wholesalemarket, under the government supervision, it could be concluded that the behavior choices of wholesalemarkets and wholesalers were in line with the theoretical analysis in the process of quality inspection serviceof agricultural products. The level of agricultural products quality inspection service should be improved and the safety of quality of agricultural products should be guaranteed by ＂standard management＂ of wholesale markets under the government supervision.