管理者任期、内部控制与战略差异

Manager Tenure,Internal Control and Strategic Differences

本文运用战略管理理论、委托代理理论和高阶梯队理论,以我国2011—2014年沪深两市A股类上市公司为研究样本,考察了内部控制对战略差异影响以及管理者既有任期和预期任期在这种影响中的调节作用。研究结果表明:内部控制与战略差异呈显著负相关;管理者既有任期在内部控制影响战略差异中的调节作用呈倒U型;管理者预期任期在内部控制影响战略差异中起正向调节作用。进一步研究表明,在非国有上市公司中内部控制与战略差异的负相关以及管理者既有任期的调节作用均比国有上市公司更显著,而管理者预期任期的调节作用则在国有上市公司中更显著。这些研究结论对企业完善内部控制、合理选择管理者聘期、降低战略风险具有一定的启示意义。

Based on strategic management theory, principal-agent theory and upper echelons theory, sampling on listed corporations in Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock markets between 2011 -2014 in China, this paper examines the relationship between internal control and strategic differences from the top management team＇ s perspective. Research shows that： the relationship of internal control quality and strategic differences is negative which means the higher the quality of internal control ,the smaller the difference of strategy ; The mediation effect of top management team＇ s existing tenure on the relationship of internal control and strategic difference is first negative then change to be positive, and which of top management team＇ s expected tenure works positively. The relationship between internal control and strategic differences and the mediation effect of top management team＇ s existing tenure on the relationship between internal control and strategic difference in non-state-owned listing corporation are more significant than that in state-owned listing corporation, that of top management team＇ s expected tenure shows more significant in state-owned listing corporation. These results help enterprises to improve the internal control, to employ top managers reasonably and to control strategic risk.