煤炭清洁利用改革中的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Clean Coal Utilization Reform

当前推行煤炭清洁利用改革不力的主要原因在于政府和煤炭企业之间的多重委托代理关系,四阶段博弈论模型的构建解释了当前运行模式中不可调和的矛盾。针对这一矛盾,通过构建完全信息的重复博弈模型,发现市场化平等契约的方式能够充分地调动煤炭企业的积极性。博弈树模型的构建得出影响其可行性的关键因素,通过分析这些因素在煤炭清洁利用系统中的因果关系,为煤炭清洁利用战略的实施提出了建议。

The main reason for the inefficiency of the Clean Coal Utilization Reform lies in the multiple principal- agent relationship between the government and the coal enterprises,and the Four- stage Game Model clarify the incompatible contradiction in current mode. The game between the government and the coal enterprises realize in an equal contract way under the market principle. The Game Tree Model was built to find the key elements relating to the practicability,and the causation relationship of these factors were discussed,throwing out several suggestions for the Clean Coal Utilization Reform.