CEO的职位风险能获得相应的薪酬补偿吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

Do CEOs Receive a Pay Premium for the Turnover Risk? Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms of A Share

以2005—2014年在沪、深两市交易的A股公司为研究样本,实证检验了CEO职位风险与薪酬补偿之间的相关性。研究结论显示,CEO职位风险与其薪酬水平之间呈显著的正相关关系,上市公司为了留住经理人优质的人力资本、避免事前"逆向选择"或事后"道德风险"行为,会将CEO所面临的职位风险纳入高管薪酬体系的设计框架中,CEO可获得与职位风险相对应的薪酬补偿,证实了管理者人力资本理论和最优薪酬契约理论对我国上市公司CEO薪酬补偿的解释力,否定了管理者权力假说。结合我国特殊的制度背景进一步研究表明,与国有企业相比,非国有企业更有可能对CEO面临的职位风险实施薪酬补偿,且非国有企业CEO薪酬契约的风险补偿作用在市场化程度较高的制度环境下更显著。

This research studies the relationship between CEO turnover risks and the pay premium by using the data of A- Share public companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in the period 2005--2014 as a sample. The conclu- sion shows that CEO turnover risks is positively correlated with the pay premium. Companies take CEO turnover risk into exec- utive pay system design framework for retaining the high-quality human capital of managers and avoiding ＂adverse selection＂ or ＂moral hazard＂ behavior. CEOs receive a pay premium for the turnover risks. Further study indicates that the more compet- itive manager market is, the more an executive turnover risk premium is. The guiding role of the human capital theory and the optimal compensation contract theory on CEO pay systems of China＇s listed companies is confirmed, denying the managerial power hypothesis. Combined with the special institutional background in China, we find that non-state-owned controlling stake or higher degree of marketization will further enhance the CEO turnover risks premium. This study not only expands the per- spective of executive compensation contract theories, but also helps to deeply understand the mechanism of executive compen- sation design and reveal inherent reasons for the diverse executive compensation levels in different companies.