期刊文献+

论主观感质的发生及其现象学呈现--基于生物系统的观点 被引量:1

The Genesis of Qualia and Its Phenomenological Assuming——From the Biological System Point of View
原文传递
导出
摘要 作为意识的困难问题,主观感质是物理主义还原论所无法解释的,二元论以其为依据意图东山再起,但终因其本体论上的错误定位而无法对感受性质问题给出具有发展性和建设性的回答。实际上,主观感质以生物个体的自创生、需求系统和神经系统的表征为发生学前提,经由生活在现象世界中的人的现象学直观呈现出来。从认识论而言,主观感质乃至意识是有机生命个体内在地形成和把握到的关于自身的存在属性,就其实在论性质而言,它既是心的也是物的,但归根结底它是主体通过现象学直观的体察呈现出来的,因此只有以现象学体察的观照和路径才能真正把握其本质内涵,而无法用观察法来证实,这正是主观感质之所以不同于神经活动的重要根源。 As the hard problem of consciousness, qualia can not be accounted by materialism reduc- tionism. Thus dualism intends to resume its status based on qualia. However, dualism can not give a de- veloping and suggestive response on qualia due to the ontology faulted point. Indeed, from the ontogeny point of view, the prerequisites of qualia are the individual autopoiesis, need system, and the representa- tion of superior nervous. Furthermore, through the way of phenomenological assuming of man live in phe- nomenal world, the qualia eventually present. As regard to epistemology, qualia, even the consciousness is the existing attribute which is formed internally and grasped by the organism. As to its realistic meaning, it is both physical and mental, and ultimately, it manifests to the subject through the phenomenology method, i. e.. It is a conception which can be acquired by tion. That is why qualia is different from the nervous experiencing way, so cannot be certified by observa- activity.
出处 《系统科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第4期53-57,75,共6页 Chinese Journal of Systems Science
关键词 主观感质 现象学 体察 Qualia Phenomenology Experience
  • 相关文献

参考文献4

二级参考文献27

  • 1Lyean,W. ( ed. ). Mind and Cognition : A Reader[ C ]. Mass : Basil Blackwell, 1990:441 - 441.
  • 2Shoemaker, S. " Functionalism and Qualia". In Rosenthal, D. ( ed. ). ( 1991 ) : The Nature of Mind[ C]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1991:404.
  • 3Nemirow, L. " Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance". In Lycan,W. Mind and Cognition. pp. 490-499.
  • 4Block, N. "Consciousness ", In Guttenplan, S. ( ed. ). (1994) :A companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 210 -211,210 -219.
  • 5Block, N. "On a confusion about a function of consciousness, " Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1995, (18) :227 - 287.
  • 6大卫·查默斯.勇敢地面对意识难题[M]//载高新民,储昭华主编.心灵哲学.商务印书馆,2002:360-392.
  • 7Jackson, F. (1986) : "What Mary did not know", In Rosenthal, D. (ed.). ( 1991 ) : The Nature of Mind. 1986:392.
  • 8Kripke, S. "The Identity Thesis", In Block,N. et al( eds. ). The The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge: Bradford - MIT, 1997:446 - 447.
  • 9Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind. [ M ] Oxford : Oxford University press, 1996:94 - 95.
  • 10Ewing, A. C. The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. New York: Collier Books, 1962 : 110.

共引文献14

同被引文献3

引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部